Which accounts, regions, and workloads are in scope?
A useful boundary identifies the relevant organization structure, shared services, application accounts, environments, and any explicit exclusions.
AWS cloud security
Cydem combines AWS configuration review, IAM privilege analysis, exposure assessment, and authorized attack simulation to identify the paths that create meaningful cloud risk.
Request a quoteAssessment focus
Automated posture tools are useful for known patterns. Manual analysis is required to reason about IAM escalation, cross-account trust, workload identities, architecture, service relationships, and how several individually modest weaknesses combine.
Cloud risk is defined by relationships: which principal can assume which role, what a workload can reach, where data is exposed, and whether monitoring covers the path. A manual assessment adds that context to configuration review.
Scoping questions
Clear answers help define the right accounts, identities, workflows, technical boundaries, and safety constraints for the quote and test plan.
A useful boundary identifies the relevant organization structure, shared services, application accounts, environments, and any explicit exclusions.
Federation, IAM Identity Center, roles, resource policies, workload identities, and cross-account trust all shape the paths that require analysis.
Critical resources, administrative actions, production data, secrets, and deployment paths help prioritize manual review and authorized validation.
The rules of engagement should identify destructive operations, availability constraints, monitoring expectations, escalation contacts, and service-specific AWS restrictions.
Each assessment is designed to give technical teams clearer risk, usable evidence, and a defined path from finding to fix.
The assessment explains excessive permissions, trust relationships, and realistic privilege escalation paths.
Configuration issues are evaluated alongside workload identities, public exposure, data access, and architecture.
Cloud and security teams receive practical actions ordered by likely impact and the relationships between affected resources.
Assessment coverage
The areas below describe available coverage. The final test plan reflects the architecture, roles, objectives, and written authorization for the engagement.
Understand the account structure, workloads, regions, and control architecture in scope.
Analyze principals, policies, trust, and the actions that could create or extend authority.
Trace reachable services and the controls that separate public, private, and management paths.
Review access, resource policies, cross-account relationships, public exposure, and protection settings.
Assess the security boundaries around deployed applications and runtime identities where applicable.
Identify coverage gaps and validate authorized paths without destructive exploitation.
Engagement timeline
The sequence is tailored to the accounts, identities, workloads, regions, access model, and operational constraints included in the assessment.
Before engagement
Confirm the accounts, regions, services, identities, workloads, objectives, exclusions, and expected deliverables. The quote records the agreed scope and commercial terms.
Before testing
Confirm written authorization, rules of engagement, points of contact, the agreed access approach, production constraints, and applicable AWS testing restrictions.
Agreed testing window
Review the in-scope environment and assess IAM, trust relationships, public exposure, workload controls, data access, logging, and authorized attack paths.
After testing
Validate the evidence, connect related weaknesses, assess likely impact, and document prioritized findings, privilege paths, and practical remediation guidance.
After testing
Walk cloud engineering and security stakeholders through significant findings, identity relationships, affected resources, and remediation questions.
After remediation
Recheck high and critical configuration or permission findings after changes are available. Additional retesting is available at no additional charge when requested by the client.
Exact dates, testing duration, and deliverables are confirmed in the quote. Additional retesting of high and critical findings is included at no additional charge when requested. The sequence may be adapted to the agreed scope and production constraints.
Illustrative attack path
A compromised application can use its workload role, assume a more privileged identity through permissive trust, and reach a sensitive AWS resource.
Boundary to validate: Workload identity and role trust combine into privilege escalation
Methodology baseline
Methodology can draw on the AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar, IAM security best practices, service documentation, and relevant benchmarks. Testing is limited to the client’s authorized configuration, workloads, identities, applications, permissions, and architecture. Cydem does not test AWS infrastructure itself.
Examples of issues assessed
Deliverables
Deliverables are adapted to the agreed scope and give stakeholders evidence, context, and remediation guidance.
Findings across IAM, network, compute, data, detection, and configuration.
Dangerous permissions, escalation opportunities, role relationships, and external trust.
Clear explanations of how credentials, roles, workloads, and resources interact.
Practical improvements grounded in the environment and operating model.
A delivery-oriented view of what to fix first and why.
Additional validation of high and critical findings is available at no additional charge when requested.
Questions
Access, timing, production constraints, and deliverables are confirmed during scoping.
Access depends on the objectives. Configuration and architecture review can often use a constrained read-only role plus documentation and interviews. Authorized attack simulation may require dedicated test identities or additional scoped permissions agreed in advance.
Not by default. Access should be proportionate to the assessment. Administrator access is not treated as a generic prerequisite, and any higher-risk permission is discussed explicitly during scoping.
Yes. Multi-account assessments can review organization structure, SCPs, Identity Center, cross-account roles, resource policies, centralized logging, and trust paths within the agreed scope.
Yes. IAM is a major focus, including users, roles, policies, trust, permission boundaries, federation, external access, role chaining, and combinations of permissions that may enable escalation.
Automated posture tools are useful for known configuration patterns and ongoing visibility. A manual assessment adds context around IAM escalation, trust relationships, architecture, workload identities, attack paths, and how individual conditions can be combined.
Any production interaction is governed by the agreed rules of engagement. Testing uses minimally destructive validation, respects AWS testing requirements and service restrictions, and excludes destructive activity unless it is explicitly authorized.
Yes. Additional retesting of high and critical findings is included at no additional charge when requested. The relevant configuration or permission changes are rechecked after remediation is ready.